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1 Introduction
Knowledge transfer resulting from labor mobility constitutes an important source of in-
novation and growth. One stream of the literature focuses on the effects of mobility on the
innovation activities of individual firms—typically, the firm hiring the worker—and explores
the many contingencies that moderate this relationship (Boeker, 1997; Palomeras and Melero,
2010). From a more macro-perspective, studies within economics, management strategy, and
economic geography argue that a high level of labor turnover spurs regional innovation per-
formance (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Fallick et al., 2006). In this paper, we integrate these
levels of analysis to study whether labor mobility increases the total R&D output of the firms
involved. In other words, we investigate whether the notion that labor mobility stimulates
overall innovation has a firm-level micro-foundation.
Various evidence from surveys, patent files, and court cases shows that labor mobility is
an important channel of knowledge transfer between firms (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Hoti
et al., 2006; Mansfield, 1985). It is shown that firms exploit the knowledge and skills brought
about by new recruitments to increase productivity (Balsvik, 2011, Go¨rg and Strobl, 2005),
to enter distant technological areas (Palomeras and Melero, 2010; Rosenkopf and Almeida,
2003; Tzabbar, 2009), to introduce new types of products (Boeker, 1997; Rao and Drazin,
2002), and to boost R&D output (Ejsing et al., 2013). Another strand of the literature looks
at worker exits and how these affect firm performance due to interruption of routines and
loss of knowledge (Campbell et al., 2011; Wezel et al., 2006). However, as social ties are not
necessarily severed by exit, the departure of a worker also represents an opportunity for the
firm to access the knowledge available at the worker’s new employer (Agrawal et al., 2006;
Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010).
At the regional level, localized knowledge sharing has long been recognized as a major
benefit of agglomeration (Jacobs, 1969; Marshall, 1920). Saxenian (1994) pointed to the
particular importance of labor mobility for regional innovation performance. In her compara-
tive analysis of Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in Massachusetts, she argued that
the “job-hopping” culture of Silicon Valley creates tightly coupled social networks through
which knowledge flows, causing rapid innovation and growth in that region. Consistent with
this view, subsequent studies document the co-existence of high labor turnover and localized
knowledge sharing among firms in the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley (Almeida and
Kogut, 1999; Breschi and Lissoni, 2005; Fallick et al., 2006). The importance of labor mobility
is underlined by more recent studies showing that regions characterized by strong enforcement
of trade secrecy laws and covenants not to compete experience lower rates of labor turnover
but also by less patenting and entrepreneurship (Marx et al., 2009; Png, 2012; Samila and
Sorenson, 2011).
Although the literature documents the importance of labor mobility for innovation in firms
and in regions, to our knowledge, there are no empirical studies providing quantitative evidence
of the critical link between these levels of analysis. On the one hand, existing firm-level studies
look at the effect of labor mobility on the innovation activities of either the new or the old
employer but do not examine the total effect. On the other hand, regional-level studies find
a positive relationship between mobility, or variables that influence mobility, and innovation
performance and attribute this to a positive total effect of mobility on innovation at the firm
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level. From a theoretical point of view, however, it is not obvious that labor mobility increases
total innovation as the mobility event may hurt the old employer more than it benefits the
new employer. We sketch a simple model showing that mobility is more likely to occur in a
competitive labor market if it has a positive effect on total innovation. There are, however,
circumstances under which mobility does occur in equilibrium even though it reduces total
innovation.
Our empirical analysis investigates the effect of mobility of highly skilled workers in Den-
mark on the total patenting activity of the firms involved. We find a significant and positive
effect of labor mobility on total patenting if either of the firms involved has patented before.
Mobility from and to patenting firms, that is, firms with a positive stock of existing patents,
has the largest marginal effect on total innovation, namely 0.019 additional patent applications
in the subsequent year per mobile worker. For the average firm in our sample, this implies a
30 percent increase in the number of patent applications.
Our empirical findings derive from an extensive data set that combines patent applications
from Danish firms to the European Patent Office (EPO) with matched employer-employee
registry data which essentially contain a complete record of labor mobility in the Danish labor
market. This contrasts with most existing studies which trace mobility via patent files, which
implies that mobility is observed only if an inventor applies for a patent at two different firms.
Mobile inventors who do not patent again, however, are not recorded. We differentiate among
workers who joined the firm in the focal year (“joiners”), workers who have been with the firm
for at least the previous year (“stayers”), and workers who left in the previous year (“leavers”).
The focus is on R&D workers who we define as individuals (i) holding a university degree in
natural sciences, engineering and other technical fields, and (ii) who are employed in positions
classified as using or producing knowledge at an advanced level. The point of departure
of our empirical approach is a standard firm-level patent production function (Hall et al.,
1986; Hausman et al., 1984) that maps different types of labor, capital, and other observed
firm characteristics into patent counts. To control for unobserved permanent differences in
firms’ patent productivity, we employ two different count data estimation approaches: the
dynamic fixed-effect GMM estimator (Blundell et al. 2002) and the pre-sample mean estimator
(Blundell et al. 1995).
We find that a joiner coming from a patenting firm is associated with a significant increase
in the number of patent applications by the new employer. In relative terms, this type of
R&D worker contributes six times more to patenting than a comparable stayer, while a joiner
from a firm with no patent activity is no more productive than a stayer. Our interpretation
of this result is that patenting firms on average are more R&D active, and thus constitute
a richer source of valuable knowledge. The relative magnitude of the contribution of joiners
from patenting firms is sizable given that we consider the effect of mobility of an average R&D
worker, whereas most existing studies consider “star scientists” with at least two patented
inventions.
In the case of leavers, we find that a worker who left to join a patenting firm, is associated
with a significant increase in the number of patent applications by the previous employer. This
is evidence that learning from former employees documented by means of patent citations in
previous studies (Corredoira and Rosenkopf, 2010, Agrawal et al. 2006) also translates into
positive effects on the former employer’s patent productivity. In the case of a worker who left
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to join a non-patenting firm there is no significant concomitant effect on patenting. To sum
up, in relation to the effects of joiners and leavers, our analysis provides strong support for
the view that mobility of high-skilled workers stimulates total firm-level invention conditional
on at least one of the firms involved having been patent active in the past.
The analysis of the effect of mobility on total invention relies on two important advantages
of our data set. First, compared to most previous studies that use patent data to track
inventor mobility, we have a complete record of worker-level labor mobility. In addition to
avoiding possible biases arising from unregistered moves—the “unsuccessful” cases in which a
worker does not produce any inventions at the new firm—this allows us to estimate the patent
productivity of workers joining, leaving, and staying with a firm. Second, our dependent
variable—the number of patent applications—lends itself more naturally to aggregation than
other dependent variables which are employed in existing studies such as entry into a new
technology class or product area.
While we emphasize the knowledge transfer effects of worker mobility, there is a concern
that the observed correlation between mobility and patenting might be partly or even pre-
dominantly explained by other factors. To address this issue, in an extension we show that
the exchange of labor between two firms is positively associated with firms’ propensity to cite
each other’s patents, which we take as an indication that the mobility event resulted in knowl-
edge transfer. Moreover, our GMM estimation applies instruments for labor mobility based
on lagged mobility as well as industry averages of different types of mobility. This approach
accounts for any contemporaneous firm-specific shocks to patent productivity which would si-
multaneously increase both hiring and patenting, leading to upward biased estimates. Finally,
we also discuss the knowledge protection argument forwarded by Kim and Marschke (2005)
and positive assortative matching between firms and R&D workers—the firms that offer the
best research conditions hire the best R&D workers—as alternative explanations of a positive
correlation between mobility and patenting. We argue that in particular our findings on the
leavers’ side are strongly suggestive of a predominant role for knowledge transfer.
The papers closest to ours are Hoisl (2007) and Ejsing et al. (2013) which also study the
effect of labor mobility on patenting. Hoisl (2007) combines data on mobility constructed
from patent files, with background information on inventors obtained from questionnaires.
She shows that mobile inventors are on average more productive and that mobility increases
inventor productivity. However, since she does not measure the previous employer’s patent
productivity she is unable to address the effect of mobility on the total level of invention.
Using similar data to ours, Ejsing et al. (2013) show that hiring researchers from universities
has a large effect on firm patenting but they do not address the issue of how worker mobility
affects total invention.
In a related literature stream, registry data is used to test the prediction of human capital
theory that workers who acquire valuable knowledge on the job receive a wage premium but pay
for this through an initial wage discount. Møen (2005) finds evidence of such a wage profile but
Maliranta et al. (2009) find that workers are not able to capitalize on the knowledge acquired
from participating in R&D activities. Toivanen and Va¨a¨na¨nen (2012) find a significant and
potentially long-lasting wage premium for inventors of granted patents, indicating that these
workers are perceived by their firms as possessing valuable knowledge and skills. However, our
aim is to measure the importance of mobility for total invention.
3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the institutional
and theoretical background for the analysis. Section 3 describes the data and outlines the
definitions used in the analysis. Section 4 discusses our econometric approach and provides
descriptive statistics. The main results are reported in Section 5 with some corroborating
evidence and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional and Theoretical Background
2.1 The Danish labor market
Denmark ranks highly among the OECD countries in terms of worker mobility, on par with
e.g. the United States (OECD, 2009). Annual rates of job mobility measured as the pro-
portion of new employees in a firm compared to one year earlier, are in the range of 25 per
cent on average (Eriksson and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2009). Indeed, the Danish labor mar-
ket has been characterized as a “flexicurity” system (European Commission, 2010; Eriksson
and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2009) that combines “flexibility” in terms of fairly low levels of job
protection—few regulations on layoffs of individual workers and short advance notices for most
groups in the labor market—with “security” in terms of an unemployment insurance scheme
considered generous both in terms of replacement ratios and the length of insurance coverage
and an extensive, publicly subsized job-training program. Hence, although the institutional
settings differ appreciably between Denmark and the US, there are few institutional barriers
to mobility of labor between firms in both markets.
In regard to knowledge flows by worker mobility, the institutional feature that has attracted
most attention is the (non-)enforceability of non-compete agreements. It has been forwarded
as a main explanation of differences in terms of innovation and mobility that characterize e.g.
the Silicon Valley and Route 128 high-tech clusters (Gilson, 1999). Like the Route 128 case,
Denmark does allow the enforcement of covenants not to compete. There is limited evidence
on the general prevalence of non-compete clauses in labor contracts in Denmark. A recent
report by Dahl and Stamhus (2013) cited a survey of engineers in the private sector, a group
of workers highly relevant to our study. It showed that only 14 per cent of engineers are subject
to a non-compete clause. Thus, despite the enforceability of non-competes in Denmark, the
Danish labor market for R&D workers seems closer to Silicon Valley than to Route 128 in
terms of actual restrictions on labor mobility.
2.2 The Effect of Labor Mobility on Firm-Level Invention
We briefly outline the main effects of labor mobility on firms’ R&D capabilities identified in
the literature.
Reallocation of skills and abilities: R&D workers possess technical skills and problem-
solving abilities which constitute important inputs for the production of inventions. Since
these skills and abilities can only be applied in one firm at a time, they are rival in nature
(Arrow, 1962). That is, when a worker moves from one firm to another, the R&D capability
of the new and the old employer are increased and decreased, respectively.
Immediate knowledge transfer: Knowledge differs in the extent to which it is shared among
the employees of a firm. Some knowledge is “private,” resides within a single individual, and
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is available only to the current employer. Other pieces of knowledge are “social” and shared
among several employees (Spender, 1996). Some social knowledge such as a well-specified
technical process can be transferred by a single individual (Liebeskind, 1997) whereas implicit
knowledge embedded in the routines, culture, and norms of the firm typically cannot.
If a worker switches firm, the new employer gets access to the worker’s private knowledge
and the part of the worker’s social knowledge that is individually transferable. We refer to
this as “forward knowledge transfer” since knowledge and labor flow in the same direction.
The old employer loses only the worker’s private knowledge. Hence, mobility leads to sharing
of social knowledge, which is the fundamental reason why labor mobility is perceived as an
important source of aggregate innovation (Saxenian, 1994; Cooper, 2001; Franco and Mitchell,
2008).
Social ties and attention: Agrawal et al. (2006) observe that mobility results in the old and
the new employer citing each other’s patents more frequently. While the citing behavior of the
new employer can be explained by its use of the knowledge that the worker brings, the apparent
existence of “reverse knowledge transfer”—i.e. knowledge that flows in the opposite direction
to labor—is striking. Two explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed by Corredoira
and Rosenkopf (2010). First, the worker may stay in contact with former co-workers, resulting
in knowledge exchange among the firms’ employees. Second, the old employer’s awareness
of the worker’s new employer may be heightened, causing it to pay closer attention to the
new employer’s R&D activities. Although our data do not allow us to disentangle these
explanations, the theoretical predictions are clear: the increased focus of the involved firms on
each other’s activities, and the stronger personal ties among employees reinforce the forward
knowledge transfer for the new employer. Furthermore, reverse knowledge transfer alleviates
the loss of knowledge that the old employer experiences when the worker leaves.
Net effect on the new and old employer: Putting together these three effects of labor mobil-
ity suggests that the new employer gains access to new skills and knowledge. These increase the
firm’s R&D capability and provide new opportunities for knowledge recombination, thereby
increasing the inventive output of the firm (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Schumpeter, 1934).
The old employer experiences a loss of the worker’s skills and private knowledge but might
benefit from reverse knowledge flows. Thus, the overall effect of labor mobility on the old
employer’s R&D capability and inventive output is theoretically unclear.
2.3 The Effect of Labor Mobility on Aggregate Invention
Our main interest in this paper is how labor mobility affects aggregate invention. The above
arguments suggest that the inventive output of the new employer increases while the inventive
output of the old employer may decrease, leaving the total effect—the sum of the effects on
the new and the old employers—indeterminate.
In order to gain predictions for the total effect, we study mobility that occurs as the result
of wage competition among firms. Following Pakes and Nitzan (1984), we consider two firms
competing for a worker currently employed by one of the firms. If the current employer keeps
the employee, she earns profit pi. If the worker moves, the old and the new employer earn
θOpi and θNpi, respectively. The profits θOpi and θNpi include all the costs and benefits that
arise from labor mobility. Retaining the worker has value (1 − θO)pi to the current employer
and hiring the worker has value θNpi to the potential new employer. Hence, wage competition
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implies that mobility occurs if and only if (1 − θO)pi < θNpi ⇔ pi < (θN + θO)pi: Mobility
occurs if and only if it increases the joint profits of the two firms (Pakes and Nitzan, 1984).
There are opposing effects of labor mobility on the joint profit of the firms (Combes and
Duranton, 2006; Fosfuri and Rønde, 2004). First, social knowledge that was in the sole
possession of the old employer before the mobility event is shared with the new employer.
This leads to increased competition over some commercial uses of the knowledge, reducing
the profit of the old employer. Since competition destroys rents, the new employer gains less
from entry into these commercial uses than the old employer loses from increased competition.
Thus, this effect tends to deter labor mobility. Similarly, more mundane costs related to
labor turnover, such as hiring and training costs and costs resulting from interruptions of
the workflow, also tend to reduce joint profits and prevent mobility. Second, labor mobility
may increase the firms’ joint profits through its effect on invention. Firms have different
R&D capabilities and strengths, and knowledge sharing increases the likelihood that a piece
of knowledge will serve as an input to a new invention (Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Scotchmer,
1991). Therefore, knowledge sharing through labor mobility has the potential to stimulate
invention, whether in the form of greater variety, value, or speed of invention. This effect
increases the firms’ joint profits and tends to facilitate labor mobility.
Putting these arguments together, the theoretical prediction is that labor mobility occurs if
and only if the positive effect from an increase in joint invention outweighs the negative effect
from more competition and other costs associated with labor mobility. Hence, an increase in
joint invention of the firms is a necessary condition for labor mobility to occur in this simple
model.1
While this result provides a useful benchmark showing the beneficial effects of mobility
on total invention, there exist circumstances where it cannot be expected to hold. We will
illustrate these using two variations of the above model. First, suppose that the old employer
is wealth and credit constrained and cannot pay more than W¯ to keep the worker where
W¯ < (1 − θO)pi. Mobility occurs now if W¯ < θNpi, but it may decrease total invention as
the wage offered by the old employer does not reflect the true value of the worker to the
firm. Second, suppose that there are two workers who share valuable knowledge and who can
transfer it to a new employer. Then, the old employer has to pay each of these workers θNpi
to keep the knowledge and skills inside the firm. Arguing as above, it is easy to show that
mobility occurs if and only if pi < (2θN + θO)pi. If (θN + θO)pi < pi < (2θN + θO)pi, mobility
occurs in equilibrium although it reduces the joint profits of the firms.2 The reduction in joint
profits may stem from increased product market competition but also from a reduction in
total invention. Mobility does therefore not necessarily increase total invention when valuable
knowledge is more widely distributed inside the firm.
These arguments show why endogenous mobility events driven by wage competition do
not necessarily increase total invention once we leave the baseline model of the two firms with
deep pockets competing for one worker. Obviously, there are also workers switching jobs for
reasons exogenous to our model. For example, the partner may find a job in another city,
health issues may make a change of career necessary, the worker may develop a preference for
1Notice that the knowledge transfer arising from labor mobility is not a true knowledge externality, because the
new employer pays (partly) for the knowledge that the worker brings in the form of a higher wage bill.
2Rønde (2001) characterizes the equilibrium of this model for all possible values θN and θO.
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working in a different setting, etc. For such mobility events, the decision to leave is not driven
by the value of the worker to the firms, leaving the effect of labor mobility on total invention
indeterminate.
3 Data
The core of our data set is patent applications to the EPO filed between 1978 and 2006 with
at least one applicant and one inventor with Danish residency. These are patents for which
we can expect that a substantial part of R&D has taken place within Denmark. The data
were retrieved from EPO’s “PATSTAT” database.3 We consider patent applications up to
and including 2004 in our analysis since the database for the years after 2004 is incomplete.
Our data set includes 12,873 patent applications.
We use patent applications rather than patent grants because the average grant time of
four to five years for the patents in our data set (Kaiser and Schneider, 2005) implies that a
substantial number of patents applied for during the time period considered for our estimation
(2000-2004) would be lost were patent grants used.4 The “time stamp” of the patent applica-
tions is the “priority date,” the date of first filing of the invention for patent protection at the
EPO or any national patent office.
The EPO data do not have a unique firm identification number of the type used by Statis-
tics Denmark, the provider of our firm-level and employee-level data. Therefore, we mostly
manually attached our EPO data to Statistics Denmark’s firm identifiers. We were able to
assign firm identifiers to 11,280 patent applications. The unmatched applications primarily
refer to firms that went out of business before 1999. The corresponding information would in
any case have been lost in our analysis since our firm-level data start in 1999. After matching
these data with our firm-level information, we are left with 11,031 patent applications applied
for by 2,278 unique firms.
Statistics Denmark provided us with firm registry data, most importantly including firms’
sectoral and regional affiliations and physical capital book value, and registry data on em-
ployee characteristics including, most importantly the end-of-November number of employees
and their highest level of education.5 We discarded sectors with no EPO patent applications
between 1978 and 2004. Sectors are defined according to the three-digit NACE Rev. 1 in-
dustrial classification. In a final step, we merged the firm-level data with employee-level data,
which allows us to track the employment history of individual workers. We excluded firms
founded during the estimation period 2000-2004 since, as described further in Section 4, our
main estimation results are partly based on an estimator that requires information on firms’
patenting behavior prior to 2000. Finally, we discarded firms from the public sector, since its
patenting behavior is likely to be very different from that of industry.
3For information on this data set, refer to http://www.epo.org/patents/patent-information/raw-
data/test/product-14-24.html.
4There is a reporting lag between date of application and date of publication of the application in the EPO
database. This implies that not all patents applied for after 2004 had been registered in the database at the time
of data collection. We excluded these patents in order to avoid biases.
5As workers’ firm affiliations are registered only once a year, in November, we do not observe within–year
mobility.
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Our main sample consists of observations for firms that employ at least one worker in
an R&D-related occupation. We focus on these since firms with employees in R&D-related
occupations are much more likely to patent than firms with no R&D workers. Of the 2,861
patent applications during 2000-2004 that could be definitively assigned to a firm, 2,728—or 95
percent—can be assigned to firms with positive R&D employment. By excluding firms with
very little or no current R&D activity, we attempt to compare different varieties of apples
rather than apples and oranges. Our main estimation results thus include 42,507 observations
for 14,516 unique firms, and 2,728 patents over the period 2000-2004.
We define R&D workers as those employees within a firm who are likely to be engaged
in R&D-related tasks. Specifically, we apply two main criteria to identify the relevant group
of workers.6 First, the person must have a Bachelor’s, a Master’s, or a Doctoral degree in
technical or natural sciences, veterinary and agricultural sciences, or health sciences.7 This
criterion is based on the idea that knowledge flows are mainly associated with the mobility
of high-skilled workers. The definition corresponds closely to the findings by Kaiser (2006)
who uses patent inventor survey (PATVAL) data for Denmark to show that 30.5 percent of
the inventors have a Bachelor’s degree as their highest level of education, 40.8 percent have
Master’s degrees and 17.4 percent hold Doctorates. We intend to capture all individuals
possessing the formal skills necessary to perform R&D-related activities within a firm. Since
some high-skilled workers may never conduct R&D, we introduce the additional criterion that
a person’s job function must involve the use or production of knowledge at an advanced level.
This information is included in our data through the International Standard Classification of
Occupations (ISCO) coding published by the International Labour Organization.8 At its first-
digit level, ISCO classifies occupations according to their knowledge content. In particular, we
can distinguish between “professionals” (level 2) and “technicians and associate professionals”
(level 3).9 Individuals are categorized in the former group if they work in a position in
which they “increase the existing stock of knowledge, apply scientific or artistic concepts and
theories, teach about the foregoing in a systematic manner, or engage in any combination
of these three activities.” We denote this group “R&D professionals”. They are the focus
of our analysis of mobility since they are most likely to be directly involved in the creation
of new knowledge. Individuals categorized as technicians and associate professionals occupy
support positions which more likely utilize already existing knowledge. We call this group
“R&D support workers”. Since they are not directly engaged in developing new knowledge,
they are not expected to be the main carriers of knowledge between firms. Therefore, the
share of the firm’s support workers is included in our model as a control variable only.
To summarize, we define R&D professionals as individuals with a technical or scientific
degree who perform job functions with an advanced knowledge content. R&D support workers
6Other criteria are that the individual must not be retired, must be aged between 20 and 75 years, and must be
employed by a Danish firm (since we only have data on Danish firms at our disposal).
7The health sciences category includes many general practitioners and hospital doctors who a priori are not
expected to perform R&D related activities. Most of these will not be included in our estimations since we exclude
the public sector.
8http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/intro.htm
9We include R&D managers (ISCO 1237) in the group of professionals. The codes are very detailed but a change
in the way individuals were classified in 2003 prevents us from using more narrowly defined occupations consistently
over time.
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have similar formal skills but are employed in positions with less emphasis on the creation of
new knowledge. These two groups jointly constitute the current stock of a firm’s R&D workers.
We next characterize categories of R&D professionals according to their mobility status.
We differentiate between a main group simply termed joiners, who were employed in another
firm in year t − 1, and other joiners, who are workers whose job market status in year t − 1
is unknown or who graduated between time t and time t − 1. Stayers are R&D professionals
who were employed by firm i both at time t − 1 and time t. Finally, leavers are workers
employed in firm i in year t − 1 who are employed in a different firm in year t. We also
differentiate the joiners and leavers according to the patenting activity of their old and new
employers. Specifically, we distinguish between joiners who previously were employed by a
“patenting firm”, which we define as a firm with a positive patent stock at t− 1, and joiners
who previously were employed by a firm with no patents, a “non-patenting firm”. We also
distinguish between leavers who joined patenting vs. non-patenting firms. We do this to
account for the inherent differences between firms that are patent active and those that are
not. Although this is an imperfect measure of firms’ R&D activity, patent active firms are
likely to possess a workforce that is endowed with a deeper and broader R&D knowledge base
than firms that do not patent. When a worker from a patent active firm joins a new employer,
she may bring in a set of knowledge that is more valuable for invention.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Table 1 provides descriptive evidence on the basic associations between mobility and patent-
ing in our data. We compare the mean number of patents for firms with a particular status in
terms of the mobility of their R&D workers and the remaining firms in our sample. It shows
that firms that either received or lost R&D workers have a higher number of patent applica-
tions per year than firms with an immobile R&D workforce. The highest number of patents
are found for firms that have both joiners and leavers in a given year. These differences are
statistically highly significant. Clearly, such comparisons confound a large number of likely
determinants of firms’ patenting (e.g., firm size, industry, previous patenting) that we will
control for in our estimations.
Appendix A displays general descriptive statistics. Most firms in our data are small: the
average firm has around eight R&D employees and a capital stock of about DKK78 mill. (the
median is DKK2.7 mill.).10 The overall level of patenting is fairly low. The average firm applies
for 0.06 patents per year during the sample period. We also provide descriptive statistics for
the subset of firms that patented at least once before the beginning of our sample period,
so-called pre-sample patenters. These firms can be expected to patent more regularly than
the average firm for several reasons, including state dependence (Blundell et al. 1995) and the
likely presence of unobserved firm-specific factors that favor patenting. In addition, observable
firm characteristics are conducive to patenting for firms in this sub-sample compared to the
average firm in the full sample. We find that firms with one or more pre-sample patents employ
an average of 39 R&D workers, employ a stock of capital of DKK400 mill. on average, and
produce 0.76 patent applications per year.
In relation to mobility and the composition of the R&D work force, our three groups of
joiners (from patenting firms, from non-patenting firms, other joiners) jointly constitute more
10$US1 corresponds roughly to DKK5.9.
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than 20 per cent of the current year’s total employment of R&D professionals (joiners plus
the reference category of stayers). The overall level of mobility of R&D professionals is high
compared for example to the annual turnover rate of scientists and engineers of 13 per cent
reported by Kim and Marschke (2005). The group of R&D supporters amounts to 45.7 per
cent of current R&D employment.
When comparing the subsamples of firms with or without any pre-sample patents, the
share of support workers is lower for pre-sample patenters (42.3 per cent) than for the other
firms in our sample (46 per cent). Pre-sample patenters also attract a larger proportion of
their joiners from other patenting firms (2.6 per cent of the current R&D work force compared
to 1.3 per cent for firms without pre-sample patents). This is consistent with higher in-sample
R&D intensity among “pre-sample patenters”. The overall level of mobility is comparable
between the two sub-samples with 20 per cent of R&D professionals having joined within a
year in the case of pre-sample patenters against 23 per cent for firms without any pre-sample
patents.
Appendix B provides the correlations for the variables in our estimations. The table shows
that our explanatory variables are moderately correlated. This is confirmed by a variance
inflation factor of 1.86, which is well below the critical value of ten (Belsley et al. 1980).
4 Empirical approach
This section describes our patent production function and outlines our econometric approach
employed to estimate the relationship between worker mobility and firms’ inventive output.
For the patent production function we assume a Cobb-Douglas specification as it is standard
in the literature (Blundell et al. 1995; Hausman et al. 1984; Kim and Marschke 2005). Our
dependent variable is the total number of a firm’s patent applications in a given year, which we
denote by P .11 It is a count variable that takes the value zero or a positive integer which is why
we use count data models in the estimations. The mean of the count variable is exponentially
linked to the explanatory variable:
E(P ) = exp
(
ln(A) + α ln(QL) + β ln(K)
)
(1)
where QL denotes quality-adjusted R&D labor input and K denotes capital input. Our
measure of labor input is defined to be specific to a firm’s R&D activities. In the case of
capital, our data do not allow us to measure the specific input of capital to R&D, hence we
interpret capital stock as a general measure of firm size. The variable A summarizes factors
other than capital and labor that affect patent production such as sectoral, geographical, and
time effects which we also include in our empirical model.12
We choose an additive specification for quality-adjusted labor QL, following Griliches
(1967). We differentiate between four main types of R&D labor currently employed in the
firm, namely stayers (denoted by St), joiners from firms (J), other joiners (O), and support
11We omit firm and time indices for brevity in what follows.
12Our econometric specification controls for sectoral affiliation (15 sectors), five different geographical regions,
and time effects. We lag all explanatory variables except for the time, region and sector dummies by one year to
allow for time lags in the R&D process and to alleviate concerns about reverse causality.
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workers (Su). Our specification for quality-adjusted labor is:
QL = LSt + γJLJ + γOLO + γSuLSu + γXLX
= L
(
1 + (γJ − 1) LJ
L
+ (γO − 1) LO
L







where current employment (L = LSt +LJ +LO +LSu) does not include leavers (denoted X).
We normalize the effect of stayers to unity. The coefficients γr measure the contribution of
the rth worker type to quality-adjusted labor QL relative to the contribution of stayers.
Taking logs and using the approximation ln(1 + z) ≈ z for small z we plug the expression
for ln(QL) into the patent production function. This leads to our basic estimating equation
which differentiates between different R&D worker types:
E(P ) = exp
[












+ β ln (K)
]
(3)
where αr = α(γr − 1) for worker group r currently in the firm and αX = αγX for leavers. Our
estimations identify the α-coefficients from which we shall back out the productivity ratios γr.
As discussed in Section 3, our main specification also differentiates between mobile workers
who join from or leave to patenting vs. non–patenting firms. This introduces αPr and α
N
r as a
straightforward extension where the superscripts P and N denote patenting and non-patenting
firms, respectively.
The count data models we apply account for both state dependence in patenting activity
and unobserved firm heterogeneity. We account for patenting dynamics since existing firm-
level studies show that previous patenting activity has substantial positive effects on current
patenting (Blundell et al. 1995, 1999, 2002; Cre´pon and Duguet 1997). Arguing that a firm’s
stock of past own patents represents knowledge from which future patentable ideas can be
derived, Blundell et al. include the lagged discounted stock of patents as a regressor. Due to
the relative short time span of our estimation sample, we follow Cre´pon and Duguet (1997)
and use dummy variables that indicate whether or not a firm patented in previous periods as
our control for state dependence.
Our empirical approach also allows for fixed effects in order to capture unobserved firm-
specific permanent differences such as appropriability conditions for R&D investments or dif-
ferent technological opportunities that might affect current patenting. Estimating a simple
model including a dummy variable for each firm would produce consistent estimates only in
count data models where all regressors are strictly exogenous, which clearly does not apply to
variables directly related to past patenting activity such as our indicators for lagged patent
status (Blundell et al. 2002). This is similar to the kind of bias introduced by the simultaneous
inclusion of fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable in a linear model which renders the
lagged dependent variable endogenous by construction (Nickell 1981). To solve this problem,
we consider two different fixed effect approaches for dynamic count data models: a GMM
estimator (Blundell et al. 2002, Kim and Marschke 2005) and the Pre-Sample Mean (PSM)
estimator of Blundell et al. (1995). We discuss each estimation method in turn.
Blundell et al. (2002) derive a GMM estimator which accounts for both fixed effects and
lagged dependent variables. It is best compared to the more popular dynamic panel data
estimators for linear models (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995). We follow
Kim and Marschke (2005) in applying a quasi-differencing transformation to correct for fixed
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effects as suggested by Wooldridge (1991). It essentially removes the fixed effects by a non-
linear transformation, much like the standard “within transformation” in linear models and
uses longer lags of the dependent and independent variables as instruments.13 Our GMM
estimator accounts also for other endogenous variables apart from lagged patent status. One
potential concern that we discuss further in Subsection 5.2 is that causality may run not only
from mobile workers to patent applications but also in the reverse direction, or that both
are caused by common unobserved factors. We address this concern by instrumenting worker
shares. As instruments we use the firms’ own lagged shares and the average share of each
type of worker in other firms in the same sector and in the same region. The intuition is that
sector-specific and region-specific labor supply and demand shocks to other firms will affect
the demand for each skill group for the focal firm. At the same time, the average shares of the
skill groups of other firms are unlikely to be correlated with the error term of our equation of
interest—unobserved firm-specific factors that affect the firm’s patent production. Tests for
dynamic (mis-) specification that we have conducted using the GMM estimator indicate that
we need to include two lags of firms’ patent status in order to have a dynamically well-specified
model.14 Overall, the data requirements of the GMM approach leaves us with a sample of
23,769 observations for 6,751 firms for GMM estimation.
As an alternative count data approach, we consider the PSM estimator of Blundell et al.
(1995). For this specification, the full sample with a total of 42,507 observations for 14,516 firms
is available which should enhance the precision of the estimates. The idea behind the PSM
estimator is to approximate unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity by using information on
the firm’s patenting behavior prior to the start of the estimation period. This is exactly
the setting in our data: we possess information on all firms’ patenting activity from 1978
onwards, while our explanatory variables (allowing for lags) are observed after 1999 only. The
PSM estimator approximates the “true” fixed effect by the pre-sample patenting history of
each firm, which in our case consists of patents applied for during the period 1978 to 1998.
Specifically, the PSM estimator uses the average of the dependent variable over the pre-sample
period as a proxy for the correlated effects for each firm. Since a prominent feature of our
data is an overall increase in the level of patenting during the pre-sample period, we normalize
the firm’s number of patents in a pre-sample year by the total number of patents applied for
during that year.15
In addition to firm fixed effects, both our estimators account for the excess number of
zeros commonly found in analyses of economic count data such as patents, the “zero-inflation
problem” (Mullahy, 1997). For the GMM, the fixed effects transformation eliminates any
time-invariant explanatory variable—including variables that relate to the selection of a firm
into patenting or non-patenting. For the PSM estimator, we follow Blundell et al. (1995,
1999) and include a dummy variable for firms that applied for at least one patent during the
13To estimate the GMM model we use Windmeijer’s (2002) “ExpEnd” program that runs under the software
package GAUSS.
14For the GMM to be identified, the simultaneous presence of first order serial correlation and absence of second
order serial correlation is required (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell et al. 2002).
15Our approach hence allows for trends in patenting at the general level such as business cycle effects, changes
in the propensity of firms to patent rather than to opt for secrecy, or changes in the propensity of Danish firms to
patent at the EPO rather than the national patent office.
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pre-sample period. This allows the expected number of patents in-sample to differ between
pre-sample patenters and non-patenters.16
Both the GMM and the PSM estimator were originally designed as Poisson regression mod-
els that assume equality of the conditional mean of the dependent variable and its conditional
variance. In patent data, however, the conditional variance is greater than the conditional
mean (Cincera 1997), which implies over–dispersion that leads to less efficient (but still unbi-
ased and consistent) parameter estimates. More efficient estimates can be obtained by using a
Negative Binomial (NegBin) model that allows for over–dispersion. While the PSM estimator




Our estimation results are presented in Table 2. We report results for GMM Poisson, PSM
Poisson and PSM NegBin count data models.
The GMM approach requires our instruments to be strongly correlated with the mobility
terms and to be simultaneously uncorrelated with the error term in the patent production
function. We test the first property by running “first stage” regressions (not displayed here
for brevity) of our instruments and our exogenous variables on the endogenous variables. F-
tests for joint significance of the instruments should be above ten for them to be “sufficiently
correlated” with the endogenous variables (Stock et al. 2002). In our case, all F-statistics
are substantially above 10. We consider the second property by Hansen J-tests and cannot
reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are orthogonal at a marginal significance level
of more than 70 percent.
Regarding the choice among estimators and specifications, one reason to prefer PSM over
GMM is a sizable increase in the number of observations available for estimation. The choice
of a NegBin – rather than a Poisson – is suggested by a test that confirms the presence of
overdispersion. However, our results are largely consistent across all three models in terms of
signs, magnitude and even significance so we will comment mainly on the PSM NegBin results.
The PSM NegBin results will also be used for further calculations.
Looking at the effects of joiners, the statistical significance of the α-coefficients of groups of
R&D joiners is to be interpreted relative to the reference group of R&D stayers. The sign tells
us whether the corresponding R&D worker type contributes more or less to patenting than
stayers. The share of joiners from patenting firms has the largest effect on patent productivity.
For joiners from non-patenting firms, we find that their effect is much smaller. In fact, they are
not statistically significantly more productive than stayers according to the PSM estimates.
The GMM results, however, suggest a positive and marginally significant effect. We interpret
this finding of stronger positive effects for joiners from patenting compared to non-patenting
firms as reflecting that in the former (but not in the latter) case workers transfer knowledge
16This dummy variable also serves to correct for the (arbitrary) small constant added to the number of pre-sample
patents to make log-transformation of FE feasible.
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valuable for invention.17 Hence, our results suggest that any negative effects of intellectual
property protection and strategic litigation of departing employees by their old firm are out-
weighed by positive knowledge transfer effects. The heterogeneous group of “other joiners”
has a positive effect on patenting which is statistically highly significant although quantita-
tively smaller than the effect of joiners from patenting firms. This effect is most likely due
to the presence of expatriates (who are recorded as “other joiners” since they do not have an
employment history in Denmark) and graduates within this group (Ejsing et al. 2013).
For the leaver groups, their α-coefficients show whether R&D workers of this type con-
tribute to the focal firm’s patenting activity even though they are no longer employed by that
firm. Our results show a positive effect of leavers who left for a patenting firm. The effect
is equal in magnitude although statistically insignificant in the less efficient GMM estima-
tion. There are no statistically significant effects of leavers to non-patenting firms. This again
suggests that patenting firms constitute richer sources of knowledge.
Table 2 also shows that we find substantial evidence of state dependence as reflected by
highly significant dummy variables related to firms’ patent status in previous periods. This
may reflect sunk costs associated with learning to conduct successful research or more practical
knowledge related to patent application process. Our correction for unobserved heterogeneity
in the PSM model has a significantly positive impact on current patenting activity: an increase
in the number of pre-sample patents by 1 percent is associated with an increase in the number
of current patents of around 0.3 percent.
Insert Table 2 about here.
The coefficients in Table 2 do not translate directly into marginal effects as in a linear
model. To facilitate the interpretation of the magnitude of these effects, we convert the PSM
NegBin estimates into productivity ratios, the γ terms discussed in Section 4. The productivity
ratios displayed in Table 3 show that joiners from patenting firms are more than six times
more patent productive than R&D stayers, a figure that is statistically highly significant.
The related figures for other joiners from and for leavers to patenting firms are 4.9 and 3.3,
respectively. The remaining ratios are statistically insignificantly different from 1 indicating
that these groups of R&D workers are as productive as stayers.
Insert Table 3 about here.
Finally we evaluate the total effect of labor mobility on patenting which is the main focus
of the paper. We conduct a thought experiment designed to increase the rate of turnover
while keeping R&D employment unchanged. Going from period t − 1 to t, our experiment
replaces an incumbent worker with a joiner, keeping total employment constant. Compared
to the situation of no mobility, the effective labor input QL will include an additional joiner
effect, γJ , and an additional leaver effect γX , while there will be one stayer less in the firm
in period t. The total effect of mobility is then calculated as the marginal effect making
17The reverse argument may hold that patenting firms have established a reputation for strict enforcement of
patents in order to reduce the risk of knowledge leaks due to worker exit (Agarwal et al. 2009). This would suggest
a smaller effect of mobility flows involving patenting rather than non-patenting firms, since the firm receiving the
knowledge transfer might be reluctant to use proprietary knowledge.
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this substitution.18 Partially differentiating our patent production function, Equation (1), we
obtain the total effect of mobility as:












X), i, j ∈ {N,P}. (4)
The α-coefficients are found in Table 2 for different types of workers. The expected number
of patents, E(P ), and total R&D employment, L, are evaluated for an average firm in our
sample as well as the average of firms with at least one pre-sample patent. The results are
shown in Table 4. The strongest effect is found for the total effect of one worker leaving
for a patenting firm and one worker joining from a patenting firm while keeping total R&D
employment constant. This results in an additional 0.019 patents for the average firms in our
sample, a 30 percent increase compared to the average number of patents. When evaluated
for the average of firms with at least one pre-sample patent, the same type of substitution
yields 0.044 additional patents, an increase over the average number of patents for this subset
of firms by six percent.
For combinations of leavers and joiners that involve at least one patenting firm, we find
a positive and statistically significant effect of mobility on total patenting while mobility
between non-patenting firms has no statistically significant effect on total patenting. In fact,
these findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of our basic wage competition
model set up in Section 2 that labor mobility increases the total innovative output of the firms
involved.
Insert Table 4 about here.
5.2 Identification issues
In this section, we discuss our findings and provide additional evidence to corroborate our
interpretation of the main results as being driven by knowledge spillovers from mobility. First,
we establish a “paper trail” of patent citation links between firms that are connected by labor
flows. Second, we examine the importance of other potential drivers of our results. Specifically,
if a firm is ramping up its R&D activities to further exploit an already existing knowledge base
within the firm while hiring additional workers to perform the R&D, mobility and innovation
could be positively correlated without there being any flow of knowledge between firms. Third,
we address the argument in Kim and Marschke (2005) of preemptive patenting in the face of
labor mobility. Finally, we discuss the extent to which our results could be affected by positive
assortative matching between workers and firms.
First, we want to verify that the probability of citation links between firms increases if there
is movement of labor between the firms. The presumption is that if a worker joins another firm
and transfers knowledge, there will be an increased likelihood of patent citations between the
firms. Mobility between the firms can go in either direction, or there might be a bi-directional
exchange of labor. For the event that firm A, say, cites firm B, we distinguish between (i) a
forward “joiner” effect if one or more R&D workers join firm A from firm B, and (ii) a reverse
“leaver” effect if one or more R&D workers left firm A for firm B in the previous period.
18Technically, this measures the total effect of an infinitesimal change in each of the joiner, leaver and stayer
groups involved, leaving employment unchanged.
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We construct a dyadic data set of all possible combinations of firms that patent within the
present period (“firm A”) and firms which hold a positive patent stock at the beginning of the
period (“firm B”). We define indicator variables for (i) the event of one or more workers joining
firm A from firm B, and (ii) one or more R&D workers leaving firm A for firm B. For the case
of bi-directional mobility, we define a separate indicator variable coded 1 if such bi-directional
exchange occurred (and 0 otherwise). We set the forward and reverse mobility indicators to
0 if the bi-directional variable is coded 1. Finally, we define our dependent variable as an
indicator of the existence of one or more citations in firm A’s current patent application, to a
patent in firm B’s patent stock.
Table 5 shows the results of linear regressions of the citations link variable on our three labor
mobility indicators.19 The positive and statistically significant coefficients of our three mobility
dummy variables show that labor mobility is positively associated with the probability of firm
A citing a firm B patent. This holds for all three types of mobility: a joiner’s link, a leaver’s
link, and the bi-directional link. The key finding holds for the base specification which includes
the mobility terms only (1st column), for a specification where we also control for industry
and year fixed effects (2nd column), and for further firm characteristics (total number of R&D
workers and size of the patent stock of the cited firms, 3rd column) in addition to industry
and year controls. The results displayed in Table 5 strongly corroborate our interpretation of
the results from the main empirical analysis: both forward and reverse labor mobility appear
to be positively associated with “paper trails” of knowledge flows.
Insert Table 5 about here.
A second issue is the potential importance of other underlying drivers of both mobility
and innovation. The idea is that firms realize a new technological opportunity and prepare to
patent by spending heavily on R&D, investing in a laboratory and filling it with R&D workers.
If such an alternative interpretation holds, our estimated joiner effect could simply be picking
up R&D investments possibly unrelated to knowledge flows. Our GMM results reported in
Table 2 apply instruments for firm mobility based on lagged values and industry averages
which implies that they are not sensitive to temporary firm-specific shocks. The fact that the
GMM results show even larger effects of joiners than the PSM estimation results is therefore
supportive of our main interpretation.
A third issue related to the interpretation of our results is the knowledge protection argu-
ment proposed by Kim and Marschke (2005). It suggests that firms patent in order to prevent
workers from transferring knowledge to other firms. This could go some way in explaining a
positive leaver effect. However, the leaver effect in our model on average materializes one year
after the worker has left the firm which makes it unlikely that the patenting activity is related
to an attempt to protect a specific invention that the departing worker had knowledge of. Fur-
thermore, if we re-estimate the model using two lags instead of just one for all R&D worker
related variables, the estimated leaver effect is actually larger than in the one-lag specification
although it is slightly less significant which is likely due to a substantial reduction in sample
size caused by the additional lag. This suggests that the effect is not primarily driven by any
protective measures taken by the old firm since they would need to be put in place soon after
the worker departed in order to secure priority over the invention.
19Probit regressions regressions generate very similar results and even stronger significance.
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Finally, although our data are very detailed with regard to individual characteristics, there
is some concern related to the selection of R&D workers with different unobserved ability or
human capital endowment into different types of firms. The thought experiment underlying our
calculations of the total effect of mobility assumes homogenous unobserved qualities of joiners,
leavers, and stayers. We might suspect that firms with the best conditions for conducting
research may attract the best workers, so-called “positive assortative matching” (Becker, 1973).
In relation to matching R&D workers to firms this would suggest that workers in patenting
firms are of higher quality on average than workers in firms with no previous patenting activity.
This could explain at least part of the difference between the effects of joiners from these two
types of firms that we observe. However, a similar argument would apply to the leavers’ side.
Leavers to firms with previous patenting activity are on average of higher ability and the old
firm suffers a greater loss of human capital for this group than for leavers to firms with no
previous patenting. In this interpretation of our results, selection may upwardly bias the effect
on joiners from firms with previous patenting activity and likewise downwardly bias the effect
on leavers to firms with previous patenting activity. While we cannot assess the actual extent
of these biases, they would have opposing effects on the total effect of mobility in Equation (4).
More importantly, even if the estimated effects of joiners from patenting and non-patenting
firms were entirely due to matching on unobserved differences in worker quality, a positive
effect of mobility on total patenting due to knowledge transfers is supported by the finding of
a (possibly downward biased) positive leaver effect.
5.3 Robustness checks
We conduct five different robustness checks: (i) accounting for patent heterogeneity by weigh-
ing them according to the number of citations received; (ii) discarding the top 20 patenting
firms, or alternatively all the biotechnology firms, to check whether our main results are driven
by selected firms; (iii) applying a more narrow definition of R&D workers by considering only
workers with a Master’s or Doctoral degree; (iv) re-running the regressions without correcting
for trends in overall patenting behavior; and (v) checking if there are non-linearities in the
relationship between mobility and patenting.20
First, there might be some concern that our estimates do not account for patent value
heterogeneity. It is well known that the distribution of the economic and technological value
of patents is heavily skewed in the sense that a few patents are very high value, while most
have very little value (see the discussion in, e.g., Hall et al., 2005, Harhoff et al., 1999 and
Lanjouw et al., 1998). Trajtenberg (1990) suggests using forward citations, the number of
citations a patent receives, to approximate patent value. Like Trajtenberg (1990), we weigh
each patent by 1 plus the number of citations a patent received within three years after EPO
publication. Our patent citation data are from the “EPO/OECD patent citations database”
which is available from the OECD (Webb et al., 2005) and covers the period 1978-2006. The
citations-weighted and citations-unweighted estimation results show only slight differences.
The significant coefficients in the estimates referring to joiners become slightly larger, while
the coefficients of leavers remain almost unchanged. Citation-weighing hence generates results
20For reasons of space, the full estimation results are not displayed here but are relegated to a set of additional
tables displayed at the end of the paper.
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that corroboate our main result that mobility enhances total innovation.
Second, while our sample is representative of firms that employ one or more R&D workers,
there is a concern as to the generality of our results. They could be driven primarily by selected
industries or firms which are very patent active. When re-estimating our main specification,
either excluding the biotechnology sector or the 20 most patent active firms, we find that
the results of the estimations on these restricted samples differ very little qualitatively and
quantitatively from our main results based on the full data.
A third issue is related to our R&D worker definitions. The main worry is that their
definition might be too broad if it includes groups of workers that are unlikely to be engaged
in research. The effect, if any, would be to bias our main results downwards. To assess the
importance of this argument, we apply a less inclusive definition that selects only workers with a
Master’s or Ph.D. degree. Somewhat surprisingly, this leads to effects that are generally smaller
than our main results. We interpret this finding as meaning that workers with a Bachelor’s
level degree constitute a significant fraction of actual inventors in Denmark, consistent with
survey evidence reported by Kaiser (2006).
A fourth robustness check relates to our trend correction of correlated effects as discussed
in Section 4. Leaving out the normalization for the general upward trend in patenting activity
leads to very similar results in terms of positive and significant effects of both joiners from and
leavers to patenting firms. The main difference is that the effect of other joiners is no longer
significant. The effect of joiners from non-patenting firms is now significantly different from
zero although still appreciably smaller that the effect of joiners from patenting firms.
As a final robustness check, we address potential non-linearities of the relationship be-
tween mobility and patenting as considered e.g. by Mu¨ller and Peters (2010). To this end,
we extended the linear QL specification in Equation (2) by quadratic terms which leads to
interaction terms between worker shares and levels of the mobile worker terms in Equation
(3). The extended model shows indications of collinear terms and also convex effects which
are hard to interpret outside a limited range of adjustments. However, moves of any type
that involve ten workers or less account for 98 per cent of all observations in our data and
our results for the experiment in Table 4 of substituting joiners for leavers of different types
show little qualitative change within that range. Considering substitutions of at most ten R&
D workers, we find that the total effect of mobility remains positive if at least one group of
workers moves to or from a patenting firm. For moves that involve leavers to patenting firms,
the effect loses significance towards the upper end of the range.
6 Conclusions
This paper assesses the quantitative importance of inter-firm labor mobility for invention, using
a unique data set that combines patent applications by Danish firms to the European Patent
Office with matched employer-employee registry data that track the employment history of
R&D workers across time. We estimate the effect of labor mobility on the total patenting
activity of the firms involved in labor mobility events.
In line with results in the previous literature, we show that an inflow of workers is associ-
ated with an increase in the firm’s patenting activity. A worker joining from a patenting firm
has a six times higher patenting productivity than a worker who stays with the firm. Inter-
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estingly, worker departure is not associated with a decrease in patenting. A worker who left
to join a patenting firm contributes three times more to the original firm’s patenting activity
than a worker that stays, while a worker leaving for a non-patenting firm has no significant
concomitant effect on patenting. Most importantly, we show that firms are not involved in
a zero-sum game when competing for R&D workers to increase their R&D output. Worker
mobility is related to a positive and statistically significant increase in total invention by the
old and the new employer. The effect on total invention is strongest for mobility between two
patenting firms where a mutual exchange of labor increases the total patenting of the firms
involved by 0.019. While this number might seem low, it compares to an average number
of 0.064 patents per year for the average firm in our data which implies an increase in total
patenting of 30 per cent. Mobility between firms with patenting history is not associated with
a significant increase in total patenting.
These results, to the best of our knowledge, provide the first quantitative support for the
notion that inter-firm mobility stimulates total innovation. In her study of Silicon Valley, Sax-
enian (1994) argues that “job-hopping” is crucially important for the innovative performance
of the firms in that region, and our results confirm the importance of labor mobility in a much
more representative setting covering all types of industries in Denmark.
A key issue is whether it is knowledge transfer related to labor mobility that causes the
observed increase in patenting. We provide several pieces of evidence supporting this interpre-
tation. First, we show that mobility is associated with an increase in the probability of the old
and the new employer citing each other in subsequent patents, which suggests that mobility
does lead to knowledge transfer between the firms. Second, we find both qualitatively and
quantitatively very similar results when we instrument labor mobility to reduce concerns that
our results might be driven by unobserved factors simultaneously affecting both hiring and
patenting. Third, we leverage the complete picture of labor mobility presented by our data
to argue that alternative explanations based on knowledge protection or positive assortative
matching are unlikely to be predominant explanations of the observed correlations between
mobility and patenting.
We regard our results as improving our understanding of the circumstances in which la-
bor mobility stimulates firm-level innovation and aggregate growth. However the results in
this paper should be interpreted with caution in relation to drawing conclusions regarding
the optimal level of labor turnover in an industry or region. In a small country such as Den-
mark, firms are likely to face very similar labor market conditions. This is advantageous for
the econometric identification but the results represent the association between mobility and
patenting given the rate of labor turnover in Denmark. An important factor that must be
considered is how labor turnover affects firms’ incentives to invest in R&D. It would clearly be
an important contribution if future work investigated exogenous variations in mobility rates
to analyze how it affects aggregate innovation in an analysis of optimal turnover rates.
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Table 1: Average number of patents per year by mobility status
Mean SD p–value
At least one firm joiner & no firm leavers 0.049 0.626 0.000
At least one firm leaver & no firm joiners 0.036 0.421 0.000
At least one firm joiner & at least one firm leaver 0.414 3.193 0.000
Table 1 shows the mean number of patents and the corresponding standard deviation for firms with
particular types of mobile workers. The p-values correspond to two-sided t-tests for statistically significant
differences between firms with a specific type of mobile workers and firms with no firm joiners and no
firm leavers in a given year. The mean number of patents of firms without mobile workers is 0.011 with a
corresponding standard deviation of 0.258.
Table 2: Main estimation results
GMM Poisson Poisson PSM NegBin PSM
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
R&D worker shares
Joiners from patenting firms 2.552** 1.210 1.543*** 0.400 1.608*** 0.278
Joiners from non–patenting firms 0.858* 0.495 0.506 0.385 0.362 0.336
Other joiners 1.362** 0.638 1.238*** 0.337 1.121*** 0.274
Support -0.128 0.282 0.389 0.333 -0.109 0.203
Leavers to pat. firms 0.957 0.884 0.916** 0.464 0.668** 0.321
Leavers to non–pat. firms 0.106 0.267 -0.813 0.773 -0.486 0.424
Capital and R&D labor
ln(total R&D workers) 0.372* 0.103 0.384*** 0.104 0.289*** 0.059
ln(capital stock) 0.016 0.029 0.238*** 0.068 0.138*** 0.036
Lagged patent status and pre–sample variables
Dummy patent t− 1 1.482*** 0.364 2.026*** 0.366 1.308*** 0.138
Dummy patent t− 2 0.628*** 0.173 1.080*** 0.122 0.842*** 0.107
ln(# pre-sample patents) — — 0.091 0.120 0.264*** 0.087
Dummy pre-sample patent — — -0.081 0.278 0.386 0.247
Number of observations and number of firms
# of obs. 23,769 42,507 42,507
# of firms 6,751 14,516 14,516
Table 2 displays estimation results for GMM fixed effects Poisson, PSM Poisson, and PSM NegBin
specifications. “SE” denotes the standard error. Patent citation weights have not been applied. The
PSM specifications additionally include sector dummies, year dummies, region dummies and a constant
term. These variables are time–invariant and drop out of the fixed effects GMM specification. The GMM
specification uses Wooldridge moment conditions and contains year dummies. It uses lagged R&D worker
shares and the average share of each type of workers in other firms in the same sector as instruments for
R&D worker shares. The asterisks ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote marginal significance at the one, five and ten
percent level.
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Table 3: Relative patent productivities
γr p–value
Joiners from patenting firms 6.559 0.000
Joiners from non–patenting firms 2.252 0.286
Other joiners 4.873 0.000
Support 0.624 0.597
Leavers to patenting firms 3.309 0.042
Leavers to non–patenting firms -0.680 0.253
Table 3 displays the productivities of different types of R&D workers relative to the productivity of
R&D stayers. The p-value denotes the marginal significance level for the hypothesis that the relative
productivity equals one. These calculations are based on the PSM NegBin results displayed in Table 2.
Reading example: Joiners from patenting firms are 6.6 times more patent–productive than R&D stayers.
Table 4: Total effects of mobility
Left for Left for
patenting non–patenting
firm firm
Coeff. p–value Coeff. p–value
Average firm
Joiners from patenting firms 0.019 0.000 0.009 0.018
Joiners from non–patenting firms 0.009 0.020 -0.001 0.812
Average firm with at least one pre-sample patent
Joiners from patenting firms 0.044 0.000 0.022 0.018
Joiners from non–patenting firms 0.020 0.020 -0.002 0.812
Table 4 displays our estimates of the total change in the number of patents if one worker left the
firm while one worker joins the firm, keeping total R&D employment constant. The upper panel
displays our results across all observations and the lower panel shows results for firms with at least
one pre–sample patent. These calculations are based on the PSM NegBin results displayed in Table
2. Reading example: if one R&D worker leaves for a patenting firm and one worker previously em-
ployed by a patenting firm joins, the expected increase in the number of patents is 0.019 for the average firm.
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specifi- & year Firm
cation dummies characteristics
Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err. Coeff. Std.err.
Forward R&D worker mobility only 0.010*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003
Reverse R&D worker mobility only 0.016*** 0.006 0.016*** 0.006 0.015*** 0.006
Bi–directional flows of R&D workers 0.047* 0.026 0.047* 0.026 0.045* 0.026
Year dummies no yes yes
Industry dummies no yes yes
Firm characteristics no no yes
Table 5 displays linear regression results for a firm’s probability to cite another firm’s patents. The
results to the left refer to the base model which includes the three worker flow terms and a constant. The
specification in the middle additionally includes year dummies and dummies for firms being in the same
industry. The model to the right also includes the log number of R&D workers of the citing firm, the log
number of R&D workers of the cited firm, and the lagged log stock of patent applications. Years 2000
through 2004 are included. There are 516,049 dyads, 141 non-zero citation links, 1,011 instances of firms
linked by a forward mobility link only, 866 instances of reverse links, and 168 instances of bi-directional
mobility links. “SE” denotes the standard errors which are clustered at the firm–level. The asterisks ‘***’
and ‘*’ denote marginal significance at the one and ten percent levels.
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics
Obs. without pre– Obs. with pre–
All obs. sample pat. sample pat.
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variable
# patent appl. t 0.064 — 0.015 — 0.761 —
Dummy patent t− 1 0.019 — 0.005 — 0.209 —
Dummy patent t− 2 0.015 — 0.004 — 0.169 —
R&D worker shares (base: R&D stayers)
Joiners from patenting firms 0.014 0.089 0.013 0.089 0.026 0.089
Joiners from non–patenting firms 0.062 0.199 0.063 0.203 0.046 0.122
Other joiners 0.051 0.182 0.052 0.186 0.043 0.122
Support 0.457 0.441 0.460 0.447 0.423 0.337
Leavers to pat. firms 0.014 0.091 0.013 0.089 0.032 0.110
Leavers to non–pat. firms 0.077 0.244 0.077 0.248 0.074 0.184
Capital and R&D labor
Total R&D workers 7.693 44.570 5.473 25.694 39.043 140.253
Capital stock (in mio. DKK) 77.50 1’280 54.80 1’140 399.00 2’520
Year dummies (base: 2000)
2001 0.203 — 0.202 — 0.206 —
2002 0.196 — 0.196 — 0.202 —
2003 0.187 — 0.187 — 0.190 —
2004 0.183 — 0.183 — 0.181 —
Sector dummies (base: wholesale and retail trade)
Farm & food 0.016 — 0.016 — 0.019 —
Textiles & paper 0.041 — 0.041 — 0.036 —
Plastic & glass 0.026 — 0.023 — 0.072 —
Chemicals 0.014 — 0.011 — 0.054 —
Metals 0.049 — 0.047 — 0.084 —
Machinery 0.069 — 0.057 — 0.233 —
Electrics 0.030 — 0.028 — 0.067 —
Medical technology 0.018 — 0.015 — 0.063 —
Vehicles 0.007 — 0.006 — 0.021 —
Furniture 0.016 — 0.016 — 0.021 —
IT 0.070 — 0.072 — 0.035 —
Technical services 0.140 — 0.141 — 0.127 —
Business related services 0.095 — 0.099 — 0.044 —
Other 0.180 — 0.191 — 0.023 —
Region dummies (base: Greater Copenhagen)
Sjælland 0.097 — 0.098 — 0.088 —
Syd 0.224 — 0.223 — 0.237 —
Midt 0.207 — 0.208 — 0.196 —
Nord 0.074 — 0.073 — 0.090 —
Pre–sample variables
# pre–sample patents 0.061 1.465 — — 0.929 5.625
Dummy pre–sample patent 0.066 — — — 1.000 —
# obs. 42’507 39’696 2’811
The table displays descriptive statistics for the entire set of observations, for observations with a pre–sample
patent and for those without a pre–sample patent. “SD” denotes the respective standard deviation.
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Appendix B: Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) # patent applications 1
(2) Share from pat. firms 0.014 1
(3) Share from non–pat. -0.006 -0.032 1
(4) Share other joiners 0.001 -0.002 -0.050 1
(5) Share support -0.012 -0.115 -0.253 -0.240 1
(6) Share to pat. firms 0.011 0.070 0.022 0.040 -0.084 1
(7) Share to non–pat. firms -0.007 0.024 0.092 0.082 -0.172 0.043 1
(8) ln(cap. stock) 0.112 0.016 -0.030 -0.059 0.100 0.025 -0.003 1
(9) ln(total R&D workers) 0.193 0.031 -0.017 -0.025 -0.067 0.055 0.030 0.410 1
(10) Dummy patent t− 1 0.319 0.042 -0.007 0.003 -0.029 0.033 -0.009 0.151 0.264 1
(11) Dummy patent t− 2 0.288 0.034 -0.014 -0.003 -0.025 0.039 -0.009 0.139 0.240 0.417 1
(12) ln(# pre-sample pat.) 0.269 0.038 -0.020 -0.009 -0.027 0.055 -0.004 0.227 0.349 0.451 0.406 1













Share joiners from patenting firms 1.877 *** 0.344
Share joiners from non‐patenting firms 0.115 0.453
Share other joiners 1.397 *** 0.323
Share support workers 0.196 0.230
Share leavers to pat. firms 0.762 * 0.403
Share leavers to non‐pat. Firms ‐0.631 0.422
ln(capital stock) 0.127 *** 0.043
ln(total R&D workers) 0.309 *** 0.066
Dummy patent t‐1 1.233 *** 0.148
Dummy patent t‐2 1.110 *** 0.134








Share joiners from patenting firms 1.714 *** 0.279
Share joiners from non‐patenting firms 0.431 0.338
Share other joiners 1.155 *** 0.278
Share support workers ‐0.070 0.197
Share leavers to pat. firms 0.629 ** 0.322
Share leavers to non‐pat. Firms ‐0.537 0.428
ln(capital stock) 0.143 *** 0.033
ln(total R&D workers) 0.270 *** 0.056
Dummy patent t‐1 1.257 *** 0.140
Dummy patent t‐2 0.822 *** 0.112

















Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Share joiners f 1.630 *** 0.278 1.519 *** 0.282
Share joiners f 0.393 0.336 0.250 0.342
Share other jo 1.149 *** 0.275 0.975 *** 0.273
Share support ‐0.086 0.204 ‐0.200 0.166
Share leavers  0.718 ** 0.342 0.710 *** 0.275
Share leavers  ‐0.470 0.424 ‐0.415 0.409
ln(capital stoc 0.283 *** 0.059 0.206 *** 0.053
ln(total R&D w 0.150 *** 0.036 0.147 *** 0.033
Dummy paten 1.320 *** 0.140 1.284 *** 0.136
Dummy paten 0.841 *** 0.108 0.947 *** 0.124
ln(# pre‐samp 0.260 *** 0.088 0.097 * 0.052







Share joiners from patenting firms 1.247 *** 0.236
Share joiners from non‐patenting firms 0.425 * 0.248
Share other joiners 0.791 *** 0.235
Share support workers 0.290 0.221
Share leavers to pat. firms 0.274 ** 0.127
Share leavers to non‐pat. Firms ‐0.775 ** 0.334
ln(capital stock) 0.167 *** 0.039
ln(total R&D workers) 0.256 *** 0.060
Dummy patent t‐1 1.271 *** 0.156
Dummy patent t‐2 0.819 *** 0.114















Share joiners from patenting firms 1.486 *** 0.280
Share joiners from non‐patenting firm 0.610 ** 0.298
Share other joiners 0.502 0.436
Share support workers ‐0.120 0.193
Share leavers to pat. firms 0.629 * 0.331
Share leavers to non‐pat. Firms ‐0.422 0.411
ln(capital stock) 0.140 *** 0.035
ln(total R&D workers) 0.255 *** 0.058
Dummy patent t‐1 1.222 *** 0.146
Dummy patent t‐2 0.778 *** 0.107
ln(# pre‐sample patents) 0.347 *** 0.084







# Share (%) # Share (%) # Share (%) # Share (%)
0 39'738 57.5 35'239 56.9 39'448 57.8 33'650 64.8
1 1'928 29.6 4'971 29.5 2'027 28.0 5'419 21.5
2 355 5.4 1'018 6.0 459 6.3 1'515 6.0
3‐5 316 4.8 778 4.6 361 5.0 1'125 4.5
6‐8 77 1.2 217 1.3 105 1.4 325 1.3
9‐10 26 0.4 69 0.4 30 0.4 102 0.4
11‐15 36 0.6 101 0.6 34 0.5 158 0.6
16‐25 14 0.2 66 0.4 27 0.4 113 0.4
26‐50 10 0.2 31 0.2 12 0.2 57 0.2
51‐75 2 0.0 11 0.1 3 0.0 25 0.1
76‐100 3 0.0 3 0.0 0 0.0 12 0.0
>100 2 0.0 3 0.0 1 0.0 6 0.0













Share joiners from patenting firms 1.535 *** 0.288
Share joiners from patenting firms*# joiners from patenting firms ‐0.017 *** 0.003
Share joiners from non‐patenting firms 0.164 0.360
Share joiners from non‐patenting firms*# joiners from non‐patenting firms 0.052 0.033
Share other joiners 0.708 ** 0.314
Share other joiners*# other joiners 0.114 *** 0.025
Share support workers ‐0.137 0.203
Share leavers to pat. firms 0.515 0.330
Share leavers to pat. firms*# leavers to pat. firms 0.027 *** 0.004
Share leavers to non‐pat. Firms ‐0.185 0.410
Share leavers to non‐pat. firms*#  leavers to non‐pat. firms ‐0.099 ** 0.046
ln(capital stock) 0.142 *** 0.036
ln(total R&D workers) 0.277 *** 0.062
Dummy patent t‐1 1.338 *** 0.130
Dummy patent t‐2 0.843 *** 0.107
ln(# pre‐sample patents) 0.235 *** 0.070















# substitutions Coeff. p ‐val. Coeff. p ‐val.
1 Joiners from patenting firms 0.2685 0.0000 0.1446 0.0136
Joiners from non‐patenting firms 0.1052 0.0765 ‐0.0188 0.7770
2 Joiners from patenting firms 0.5398 0.0000 0.2591 0.0279
Joiners from non‐patenting firms 0.2309 0.0519 ‐0.0498 0.7098
5 Joiners from patenting firms 1.3705 0.0000 0.4223 0.1827
Joiners from non‐patenting firms 0.7320 0.0173 ‐0.2161 0.5584
8 Joiners from patenting firms 2.2262 0.0000 0.3150 0.5859
Joiners from non‐patenting firms 1.4187 0.0075 ‐0.4926 0.4791
10 Joiners from patenting firms 2.8106 0.0000 0.0930 0.9073
Joiners from non‐patenting firms 1.9795 0.0051 ‐0.7380 0.4514
Leavers Leavers
to non‐
patenting firmsfirms
to patenting
